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GETTING THERE FIRST WITH THE BEST:
THE NEED TO SHORTEN THE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to unnecessary time delays, high costs and safety concerns, drug
regulation in the United States is in need of reform.' The United States
consistently lags behind the rest of the developed world in the approval of new,
innovative, and efficient medications.2  Therefore, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) needs to implement creative and effective changes in the
prescription drug approval process3 in order to protect the health of the
American public. Most Americans think that the FDA's stringent process for
approving new prescription drugs guarantees that prescription drugs are
successfully monitored.4 The American public assumes that safe and innovative
drugs are made available to the public as quickly' and cost effectively6 as
possible, while unsafe7 products are kept off the market.' However, this
confidence placed in the FDA is unwarranted. 9 In the area of new drug
1. See infra notes 16-62 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 16-62 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 265-353 and accompanying text.
4. Louis Lasagna, Congress, The FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962,
32 PERsp. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 322 (1989).
5. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
8. Unfortunately, there is a vast discrepancy between perception and reality, especially when
opinions concern the effectiveness of the FDA. Although Americans place a great deal of trust in
the agency, including the erroneous belief that the FDA itself actually tests the safety and efficacy
of new drugs before they are approved for sale, the FDA falls significantly short of embodying these
idealized standards for drug security. Louis Lasagna, Congress, 7he FDA, and New Drug
Development: Before and After 1962, 32 PERsP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 322 (1989).
9. The drug development process in the United States has been frequently criticized for being
unnecessarily time-consuming and costly. John C. Petricciani, Disease, Drugs, and Delay:
Suggested Changes for the FDA, 38 CLINICAL RES., 701, 701 (1990). This criticism has come
from many directions and sources. These sources include investigative bodies, pharmacologists,
doctors, and economists. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG APPROVAL-A LENGTHY
PROCESS THAT DELAYS THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS, GAO Rep. No. HRD-80-64
(1980); WILLIAM M. WARDELL & LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT
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development, the FDA has proven itself incapable of encouraging innovation
while simultaneously ensuring the safety of the drugs it approves. 0
This Note will examine the shortcomings of the FDA's drug approval
process. In Section II, the weaknesses in the American prescription drug
approval process will be explored." Section III will follow the historical
development of drug approval and the rise of regulation in the United States.
The most recent attempt by the President's Council on Competitiveness to
reform the drug approval process, 3 along with its questionable ability to affect
the crisis, will be investigated in Section IV. 4 Finally, in Section V,'5 this
Note will offer a unique proposal for expediting the availability of new drugs
through a comprehensive post-marketing surveillance system, consisting of three
steps: eliminating unnecessary animal and clinical testing, limited marketing
release through approved hospital pharmacies, and mandatory reporting of drug-
induced reactions and effectiveness.
II. WEAKNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
A. Time Delays
The drug approval process in the United States is a lengthy and time-
consuming process. The time between the synthesis of a New Chemical Entity
(NCE) and its final FDA approval has stretched out to a startling average of
twelve years.' 6 Despite the fact that research techniques, as well as chemical
and biochemical knowledge, have seen huge advances in the last twenty-five
(1975); Barrett Scoville, Shifting the Burden: Restructuring the Drug Review Process, 49 CUNICAL
PHARMACoLOUY & THERAPEUTICS 229, 229 (1991); SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 19-49 (1974).
10. The FDA's processes for approving new drugs are so cumbersome that the United States
suffers a significant delay in receiving innovative medical treatment in comparison to other
technically advanced nations. For example, in 1988, the average review time was fifteen months
in the country of first approval for the first sixteen products approved. In contrast, these same
products had an average review time of 29.7 months in the United States. And even more
importantly, the extra review time in the United States has not added any discernible, extra level of
safety. John C. Petricciani, Disease, Drugs, and Delay: Suggested Changes for the FDA, 38
CUNICAL RES. 701 (1990).
11. See infra notes 16-62 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 81-154 and accompanying text.
13. Recommendations to Speed Drug Approvals Issued, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Food Drug
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 42,603, at 43,617 (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Recommendations].
14. See infra notes 155-264 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 265-353 and accompanying text.
16. Even the FDA admits the process takes too long. Gerald Meyer, the deputy director of the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research has stated, "We do a very good job of making decisions,
but we don't make them in a timely manner." Ann Gibbons, Can David Kessler Revive the FDA?,
252 Science 200, 201 (1991).
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years, the number of NCEs introduced into the United States over this same
time period has dropped by fifty percent.'" This delay in the introduction of
new prescription drugs in America is commonly known as a "drug lag.""8
That is, people living in other countries have access to useful drugs before they
are available in the United States. Critics assert that the reduced innovation and
competition is attributable to the excessively severe FDA regulations for new
drug approval.' 9  On the other hand, Donald Kennedy, the former
Commissioner of the FDA, insists that the drug lag is an international
phenomenon having little to do with the regulatory climate in the United
States.' Mr. Kennedy considers the drug lag a natural result of an exhaustion
of basic scientific knowledge, knowledge on which drug companies' earlier
breakthroughs were based.2' Mr. Kennedy states that the downward trend in
drug development can only be reversed through "basic innovations in molecular
biology, fresh insights in our understanding of certain disease mechanisms, or
new therapeutic concepts. "'
Mr. Kennedy's understanding of the drug lag ignores the fact that the
United States trails other developed countries in the marketing of innovative
medical treatment.' Other experts argue that the regulatory complexity of the
FDA is largely responsible for the fact that fewer new drugs have been
introduced in the United States in the past twenty years than in numerous other
17. The rate of introduction of New Chemical Entities (NCEs) into the United States market
has declined from over 50 in 1960 to 21 in 1989. In 1985, the FDA cleared a record number of
new drug approvals by approving a total of 30 NCEs. The three year period of 1987-1989 showed
a modest decrease in the rate of NCEs approved compared with the previous three year period.
These data suggest that the much heralded, record number of NCE approvals in 1985 did not
indicate a trend toward a greater number of annual drug approvals. Kenneth . Kaitin et al., The
New Drug Approvals of 1987, 1988, and 1989: Trends in Drug Development, 31 J. CUNICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 116, 120 (1991).
18. William Wardell, The Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Area of Patterns
of Drugs Marketed in the United States and Great Britain from 1972 through 1976, 24 CUNICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 499, 499 (1978).
19. Criticism abounds from many sources. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
20. Donald Kennedy, A Calm Look at "Drug Lag," 239 JAMA 423, 423 (1978).
21. Id. at 425.
22. Id.
23. The FDA utilizes a therapeutic rating system which classifies NCEs by their therapeutic
potential. NCEs that represent important therapeutic gains are classified IA, while those that
represent modest gains are classified I B. In a survey on the delay between foreign marketing of a
new drug and the United States approval of the same drug, it was found that there was a delay of
8.9 years for IA drugs and 9.1 years for IB drugs. Kenneth 1. Kaitin et al., The New Drug
Approvals of1987,1988, and 1989: Trends in Drug Development, 31 J. CUNICAL PHARMACOLOGY
116, 121 (1991).
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developed countries.'
B. Cost
Another factor seriously limiting the innovation of new drugs in the United
States is the overwhelming cost of bringing a new prescription drug to
market.Y5 A report from the Center for the Study of Drug Development at
Tufts University found it takes an average of $231 million to get one new
medicine from the laboratory to the pharmacist's shelf.' Commentators and
drug sponsors generally blame this astronomical cost on the American regulatory
requirements.7 To meet stringent FDA requirements, corporations use money
allocated for research and development to pay for regulatory compliance
efforts.' This means that money dedicated to the discovery and development
of innovative medical treatment is instead consumed by everyday regulatory
compliance."
Furthermore, as illustrated above,' compliance takes time, which in turn
raises costs. A one-year delay in marketing can result in as much as a ten
million dollar loss because of increased regulatory costs and lost sales."
Because a company's patent on a medicine is valid for only a limited time,
reducing the approval time means more time for exclusive sales and possibly
lower prices for patients.32
The costs accruing from the lack of needed medications can be illustrated
24. William Wardell, The Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Area of Pasterns
of Drugs Marketed in the United States and Great Britain from 1972 through 1976, 24 CuNICAL
PHARMACOLOuY & THERAPEurcs 499, 521 (1978).
25. David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About Improvements at FDA, 70
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERINo NEWS 28, 28 (1992).
26. Id.
27. Note,* International Trends in New Drug Approval Regulation: the Impact on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 10 RUTOERS COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 317, 321 (1984).
28. It is virtually undisputed that regulatory requirements have increased research and
development costs, cut effective patent lives, and concentrated research and development capabilities
in large pharmaceutical companies that can afford the needed budgetary outlays. Barry S. Roberts
& Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update: The FDA Speeds Up Hope for the Desperately Ill and
Dying, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 404 (1989).
29. Id.
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. Even a slight delay in approval can greatly reduce the net present value of a drug. A one
and a half year reduction in the approval time for a new prescription drug can reduce by five years
the time it takes to recoup research costs. Barry S. Roberts & Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update:
The FDA Speeds Up Hope for the Desperately Ill and Dying, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 405-06 n.13
(1989).
32. David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About Improvements at FDA, 70
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 28, 28 (1992).
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through an examination of these costs saved once medication becomes available
to needy patients. For example, one study showed that during the years of
1954-1969, reduction in hospitalization costs of approximately $4 billion was
made possible by the development of new anti-tuberculosis drugs.3 It is
estimated that $2 billion is saved annually by using the polio vaccine.' The
new measles vaccine has produced an annual savings of nearly $180 million, as
well as averting millions of cases of acute measles and thousands of cases of
mental retardation each year3S
Amendments to the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1906'. have resulted
in progressively higher costs for bringing a new prescription drug to market.3
It has been calculated that the 1962 Amendments' resulted in a net annual loss
to consumers of $250 million to $350 million.39
C. Safety
In addition to the lengthy delays and expensive costs associated with FDA
regulation, the FDA's narrow constraints force American consumers to use less
effective prescription drugs with greater toxic side effects.' Statistics
concerning probability of lives lost due to the unavailability of necessary
33. MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS & POLrICS 14 (1974).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
37. Studies have shown that the 1962 Drug Amendments doubled the research and development
expenditures necessary to generate a given flow of new products. Experts also contend that portions
of The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 create additional time
delays. Barry S. Roberts & Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update: The FDA Speeds Up Hope for
the Desperately Ill and Dying, 27 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 405-10 (1989).
38. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)).
39. Due to a high number of uncertainties, economic studies attempting to show that the costs
of extensive regulation outweigh the benefits are necessarily speculative. A study based on an
elaborate system of consumer surplus theory analyzed the costs and benefits of the 1962 Kefauver-
Harris amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. By extrapolating trends in the
demands for drugs before 1962, the study concluded that the reduced innovation and competition
attributable to the Amendments (offset by the savings on the purchase of ineffective drugs) has
resulted in a net annual loss to consumers of $250 million to $350 million. Although increased
regulation was imposed to reduce consumer waste by eliminating ineffective or unsafe new drugs,
the cost imposed on the consumer has, in reality, outweighed the benefits. SAM PELTZMAN,
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 19-49 (1974).
40. Many recently developed drugs demonstrate substantially greater effectiveness in the
treatment of illnesses. To the extent that the FDA delays the introduction of these new, innovative
drugs, the regulatory process exposes Americans to greater health risks by forcing them to rely upon
less effective medications with greater toxicity and higher incident of side effects. Barry S. Roberts
& David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure,
1982 ARIz. ST. L.J. 581, 597-98 (1982).
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medications are difficult to estimate. However, the delayed introduction of safe
and effective new drugs into the United States continues to cost the health and,
indeed, the lives of many Americans.4 Negative effects of the two major
prescription drug related crises42 caused approximately 100 deaths43 and nine
recorded instances of congenital birth defects' in the United States. These
injuries and deaths resulted in a public outcry that was responsible for the
passage of drug reform legislation.' Yet, these deaths were significantly less
in number than the deaths that have resulted from the FDA's current system of
strict enforcement of new drug regulations that delay the availability of life-
saving prescription drugs.'
For example, an anti-epilepsy drug, sodium valproate, was introduced in
1967 in France,47 and in 1972 in Great Britain,4 but due to the drug lag in
this country, the exact same drug remained unavailable for use by American
patients until 1978. 4' The congressionally instituted National Commission for
the Control of Epilepsy and Its Consequences estimated that the absence of this
single drug from the United States market subjected American patients to
approximately 1,000,000 unnecessary seizures per year at a cost of
approximately $200 million annually.'
Another example can be seen in the United States' delay in approving the
41. In 1976, the President's Biomedical Panel warned that the delays and costs that the FDA's
protective system impose on drug development constitute a hazard to public health. American
patients have suffered a net therapeutic loss due to the conservative policies of the FDA. SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, CHEMICALS AND
HEALTH: REPORT ON THE PANEL ON CHEMICALS AND HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 111-13 (1973); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH PANEL: APPENDIX A: THE PLACE OF BIOMEDICAL
SCIENCE IN MEDICINE AND THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 19-20 (1976).
42. The two major prescription drug tragedies resulted from the use of Elixir Sulfanilamide and
the use of thalidomide. See infra notes 125-150 and accompanying text.
43. MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, & POLITICS 86 (1974).
44. Arthur H. Hayes, Food and Drug Regulation After 75 Years, 246 JAMA 1223, 1224
(1981).
45. The use of Elixir Sulfanilamide led to the adoption of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
of 1938 and the use of thalidomide led to the 1962 Amendments of the Act. See infra notes 125-150
and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
47. Barry S. Roberts & Sara M. Biggers, Regulatory Update: The FDA Speeds Up Hope for
the Desperately Ill and Dying, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 403, 404 (1989).
48. William M. Wardell, The Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Area of Patterns
of Drugs Marketed in the United States and Great Britain from 1972 through 1976, 24 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEuTICS 499, 517-18 (1978).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 518.
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drug timolol, a beta blocker used in the treatment of cardiovascular disease."'
Because cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of death in the United
States, 2 delays in the approval of drugs in this area exact a serious toll on the
health of the American public. Beta blockers have been described as the most
important advancement of the century for the treatment of hypertension and
heart disease.53 However, a significant time lag between their approval for use
in European countries and approval in the United States exists.' By 1976, the
availability of beta blockers in the United States was limited to a single drug; in
comparison, nine were available for use in Britain at the same time.5
Although timolol was already safely in use in several European countries, the
FDA delayed its approval of timolol in the United States for seven years, costing
an estimated 100,000 American lives.'
Yet another beta blocker, metoprolol, could have saved 100,000
hypertension patients from infarctions 7 and ischemic' heart diseases, had it
been timely introduced in the United States. 9 The FDA's three year delay in
approving metoprolol subjected hypertensive patients to significant physical
damage due to the unavailability of the drug.' Delays in releasing other drugs
caused similar losses.6'
51. Id. at 505-06.
52. Id.
53. When awarding the 1976 Lasker prize for clinical research to Drs. Raymond Ahlquist and
James Black, the respective discoverers of beta receptors and the clinical significance of beta
blockade, the Lasker jurors described beta blockers as one of the most important classes of drugs
to be discovered in this century. Beta blockers have been helpful in treating a number of different
kinds of illnesses. Id. at 505.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Former Commissioner Hayes of the FDA had estimated that timolol would prevent 17,000
deaths annually from secondary myocardial infarction. Anthony Hayes, Current FDA Directives for
Promoting Public Health, 39 Am. J. Hosp. PHARMACY 427, 428 (1982); Barry S. Roberts & David
Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of1962: 7he Anatomy ofa Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 581, 597 (1982).
57. Infarctions are defined as reoccurrence of a heart attack or an interruption of the blood
supply to the heart. TABER'S CYcLoPEDIc MEDICAL DICTIONARY 721 (14th Ed. 1981).
58. Ischemic is defined as a decrease in the blood supply to a body organ or part. Id. at 753.
59. Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy
of a Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 597 (1982).
60. Id.
61. In the area of cancer treatment, the United States lagged behind thirty-one other countries
in its approval of the anti-cancer drug anadriamysin. No reports have yet attempted to quantify the
consequences of the four year delay in the United States approval of this drug. Because this drug
represents the second most widely prescribed anti-cancer drug in the world, it is likely that American
patients received less effective treatment than if the drug had been available. Rifampin is the favored
drug for treating tuberculosis. Although 30,000 people still contract tuberculosis annually, the FDA
did not approve rifampin until four years after it had become available in foreign markets. Id. at
598.
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Historically, a relatively small amount of injury to the public's health
provided cause for reform of the drug approval process. In 1937, the
sulfanilomide disaster took approximately 100 lives and resulted in the passing
of new drug regulations. The unfortunate incident involving the drug
thalidomide resulted in nine cases of birth defects in the United States. This in
turn was the driving force behind the 1962 drug reforms. Yet, the current drug
approval system costs hundreds of thousands of American lives through the
unavailability of necessary drugs. These lives should be considered as
significant and provide the impetus for revising the drug approval process.
The FDA's slow and cautious approval of new drugs is intended to result
in such benefits as decreased approval of unsafe or ineffective drugs in the
United States. Instead, increased regulation of prescription drug approval has
not decreased incidents of unsafe or ineffective drug approval in the United
States.
62
D. Summary
Under the stimuli of the 1962 Drug Amendments' as well as substantial
appropriations' and heavy congressional oversight,' the FDA has imposed
increasingly sophisticated and elaborate controls on drug research involving
human subjects.' One observer has described the American drug approval
process as "the most detailed regulatory system for the protection of humans the
world has ever seen." 67 The FDA's regulatory scheme, launched by the 1962
62. SAM PELTzmAN, REoULATION OF PHARMACEUICAL INNOVATION 48 (1974).
63. 76 Stat. 780, § 103(b) (1962) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(1) (1988)) (amending
§ 505(1) of the Act).
64. On the origins and budgeting for the FDA's Bioresearch Monitoring Program, see, e.g.,
Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1977: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Health and Scienafic Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Seas. 29-32 (1977) (S. Gardner).
65. For examples of congressional oversight, see, e.g., Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1979: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. (1979); Preclinical
and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1978: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1977: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Seas. 29-32 (1977) (S. Gardner).
66. Proposal, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,186 (1978); Protection of Human Subjects; Standards for
Institutional Review Boards for Clinical Investigations, 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 56 (1981); Proposal, 44
Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1979); Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 46 Fed. Reg. 8942
(1981) (codified in scattered parts 21 C.F.R.). In some instances research has been brought into
compliance with proposed regulations, even before final regulations have been issued.
67. Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 567,
581 (1985).
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Amendments, had the yet unrealized goal of improving the quality and safety of
drugs introduced in the United States.' However, the increased regulatory
burdens have retarded the drug approval process and discouraged the innovation
of new drugs.' As a result, American patients continue to suffer and die from
diseases that could be successfully treated with drugs already available, and used
safely, in other countries.
Criticism and suggestions for change have continuously plagued the
FDA.' Legislative commissions and committees, 7' General Accounting
Office inquiries,' executive branch studies,' congressional hearings74 , and
68. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2nd Seas. 8 (1962).
69. Pharmaceutical companies claim that it costs $231 million dollars and an average of twelve
years to bring a new drug to market. Ann Gibbons, Can David Kessler Revive the FDA?, 252
SCIENCE 200, 201 (1991). Like all businesses, the actions of pharmaceutical companies are
primarily determined by economic directives. The price of hundreds of millions of dollars to
research and bring to market a single drug prohibits development of new drugs that fail to bring fast
and significant monetary return. Therefore, medications that would effect small portions of the
world's population, or large sections of the world's poor population, would not warrant the attention
of the economically minded pharmaceutical companies. One example involves the area of tropical
disease research. Despite the fact that seventy five percent of the world's population is at risk of
these diseases, the pharmaceutical industry refuses to take any measurable interest in developing
medical treatments for tropical diseases. As one research director of a United States based drug
company explains:
Of course, we could go into a big program on, say, tropical sleeping sickness or
Chagas' disease. We might put in three, or four, or five million dollars a year. In five
or ten years, we might hit on a useful new compound that could help a lot of people in
Africa or South America. They would like to have it, but neither they nor their
government could afford to pay much for it. They have the disease but not the money.
My stockholders would have my scalp.
MILTON SILVERMAN Er AL., PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEATH: THE DRUGGING OF THE THIRD WORLD
99 (1982). The purely economic focus of the drug industry combined with the extensive time lag
of the approval of new drugs, compounds the injury to the consumers. In the period between 1972
and 1976, 2.6 times as many drugs became exclusively available in Great Britain than in the United
States. The United States continues to lag behind European countries in the approval of many
important drug categories, including cardiovascular drugs, peptic ulcer drugs, and central nervous
system drugs - such as therapies for depression, epilepsy, and migraine. William M. Wardell, 7he
Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Area of Paaerns of Drugs Marketed in the United
States and Great Britain from 1972 through 1976, 24 CUINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
499, 499 (1978). Data for new drug approvals from 1987-1989 show that eighty percent of new
drugs approved in the United States were already available in foreign markets before the United
States approval, with a mean of 6.3 years of prior marketing. These data are consistent with the
figures for previous years and suggest little change in the rate of new drug development and review
in the United States. Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., The New Drug Approvals of 1987, 1988, and 1989:
Trends in Drug Development, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 116, 116 (1991).
70. John C. Petricciani, Disease, Drugs, and Delay: Suggested Changes for the FDA, 38
CLINICAL RES. 701, 701 (1990).
71. Id.
72. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG APPROVAL-A LENGTHY PROCESS THAT
DELAYS THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS, GAO Rep. No. HRD-80-64 (1980).
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public press commentaries' have focused on the agency and its
shortcomings.76 But there has been little substantive change made in the drug
approval process in the last twenty-five years.7 The most recent attempt to
hasten the FDA's drug approval process, recommendations by the President's
Council on CompetitivenessO that were adopted by the FDA in 1992,7 are
unlikely to have any real effect on the drug lag suffered by the United States.'
IH. THE RISE OF REGULATION
The history of federal drug regulation in the United States follows a distinct
pattern of little concern until a crisis erupts."' Congressional involvement
remained minimal until an informed and angry public rallied at its gates.'
Responses were shortsighted,' poorly conceived," and geared toward the
resolution of an immediate problem.' Reforms have enjoyed zealous short-
term enforcement until the issue of drug regulation faded from public memory,
at which time the governmental approach returned to the laissez-faire approach
stemming from the bureaucratic mind-set still operating in the United States."
The first recorded governmental involvement in regulating pharmaceutical
73. John C. Petricciani, Disease, Drugs, and Delay: Suggested Changes for the FDA, 38
CUNICALRES. 701, 701 (1990).
74. Reform of FDA Drug Review Process: Hearing of the Human Resource and
Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm., Federal News Service, March 19, 1992; Preclinical and
Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1979: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and
Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1979); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical ndustry, 1978: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
75. John C. Petricciani, Disease, Drugs, and Delay: Suggested Changes for the FDA, 38
CLNiCAL RES. 701, 701 (1990).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Improving the Nation's Drug Approval Process, HHS News and President's Council in
Competitiveness Fact Sheet, Nov. 13, 1991.
79. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 177-264 and accompanying text.
81. Catharine E. Bednar, A Constitutional Analysis of Federal Drug Marketing Regulations and
Food and Drug Administration Implementation, 13 Sw. L.J. 531, 542 (1983).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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agents in this country dates back to the New England colonies.' However,
legal action involving drugs was the exception rather than the rule.' Drugs
were largely unregulated in the United States until the twentieth century." By
comparison, drug regulations were common in European countries at an earlier
date.' As a result, America became the place to unload substandard and
contaminated European drugs in the nineteenth century. 9' Drugs available in
the United States were often dangerous due to widespread adulteration.'
The first law in the United States regulating drugs on a national level, the
Import Drugs Act of 1848," authorized laboratory tests of purity to be
performed on imported drugs at the site of entry." The Act also allowed for
the detainment and exportation of drugs that failed to meet pharmacopoeial
standards.95 Enforcement of the measure was initially strong, but support
dwindled and political backing caused the measure to deteriorate in its
effectiveness." Regardless of enforcement, however, the Import Drug Act
failed to rid the United States of adulterated medications because it was limited
to those substances originating abroad.' Legislation was still needed to
monitor drugs that were made and marketed domestically."
This meant Americans faced serious risk, because domestically-made
nostrums" remained the most prevalent form of medication used by Americans
87. In 1630, Nicholas Knopf was sentenced to pay a fine or be whipped for selling "a water
of no worth nor value" as a cure for scurvy. Wallace F. Janssen, The U. S. Food and Drug Law:
How It Came; How It Works, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 132, 133 (1980). Wallace F. Janssen
is the historian for the FDA.
88. Id.
89. Most colonial laws dealt mainly with foods rather than drugs. Id.
90. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 420, 422 (1981).
91. Id. The United States had a customs examination, but only to assure correct valuation for
duty purposes. Id. at 423.
92. Id. at 422.
93. Ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237, 238 (1848) (repealed 1922). The purpose of the Act was to prevent
the importation of adulterated and spurious drugs and medicines.
94. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420, 423 (1981).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Act only provided for detention, destruction, or re-exportation of shipments originating
abroad that did not meet pharmacopoeial standards. Ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237, 238 (1848) (repealed
1922).
98. Wallace F. Janasen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420, 423 (1981).
99. A nostrum is a patent medicine or quack remedy. "Nostrums were so common that they
were largely taken for granted-a part of the normal American scene. Anyone, no matter how
ignorant or unqualified, could go into the drug manufacturing business." Id. at 422.
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during the nineteenth century." Billed as "patent medicines," hundreds of
ineffective elixirs' lined the medicine cabinets of an uninformed and
unprotected American public.'°2 Medications containing such drugs as opium,
morphine, and cocaine were sold without restriction at almost every corner
apothecary."m Innocuous and inert preparations claimed to cure everything
from cancer to the common cold."'° Labels contained neither warnings nor
lists of ingredients." 5
Public sentiment that Congress should enact a law to regulate the drug
industry began after the Civil War.'0 Several bills were enacted in response
to specific drug-related tragedies,"°7 but none had the scope covered by the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906."
100. Id.
101. Nostrums had colorful names such as Kick-a-poo, Indian Sagwa, and Warner's Safe Cure
for Diabetes. Id.
102. The philosophy of the time for dealing with patent medicines was largely based on the old
policy of caveat emptor or let the buyer beware. Richard C. Litman & Donald S. Litman,
Protection of the American Consumer: The Muckrakers and the Enactment of the First Federal Food
and Drug Law in the United States, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 647, 647 (1981).
103. Many of the medications sold were positively harmful in their effects. The "headache
powers" were vicious habit-forming drugs sold under false, misleading, or incomplete labels.
Women and children became addicted to their use in tragic numbers. Mothers doped their babies
into insensibility at night with soothing syrups containing opium, cocaine, laudanum and alcohol.
The most vicious of the medical frauds was the group that preyed on incurables. Individuals with
diseases such as tuberculosis and cancer were usually willing to spend every cent they had to recover
their health, and the patent medicine suppliers were quick to supply them with cod liver oil or other
dangerous drugs. Id. at 652.
104. Id.
105. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420, 421 (1981).
106. Richard C. Litman & Donald S. Litman, Protection of the American Consumer: The
Muckrakers and the Enactment of the First Federal Food and Drug Law in the United States, 36
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 647, 648 (1981).
107. Despite the number of measures submitted, very few became law. Between January 20,
1879 and June 30, 1906, when the Pure Food and Drug Act was passed, 190 measures that were
designed to protect the consumer from misbranded or adulterated food and drugs were introduced
into Congress, a mere eight became law. Id. at 661. One of those passing into law was the
strongest drug control law ever to that point, the original Biologics Act of 1902, which came in
response to the fiasco surrounding the St. Louis Health Department. Twelve children died from
tetanus contamination of the diphtheria vaccine that the health department had self-manufactured.
Ch. 985, 32 Stat. 286, 296 (1902); Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug
Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420, 425 (1981).
108. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938). The drug provisions have been
summarized as follows:
The law, in short, made misrepresentations illegal. It did not force the
manufacturer to disclose the contents of his preparation, but if he chose to do so, the
government would monitor his accuracy. The producer was obligated to inform the
consumer about narcotic content, and he was required to adhere to common standards
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The pure food and drug movement was supported by state officials,"
professional groups,"* and some members of Congress from the movement's
very beginning."' However, the regulatory movement was offset by strenuous
opposition from many manufacturers, particularly manufacturers of patent
medicines, who were then the largest advertisers in the country." 2  Dr.
Harvey Washington Wiley was personally responsible for overcoming the
resistance created by the drug manufacturers, and the 1906 law is commonly
referred to as the Wiley Act."
3
The 1906 Act was expected to reform patent medicine by outlawing false
therapeutic claims," 4 and indeed, the Act did prohibit adulteration and
misbranding of these concoctions.'" However, a serious setback occurred in
if he chose to employ a common name for his product. In addition, no statement could
"be false or misleading in any particular"-a high standard. But if the producer wanted
to avoid the scope of the law entirely, he could produce a non-narcotic preparation, give
it a novel name, and say little about it.
Catharine E. Bednar, A Consttutional Analysis of Federal Drug Marketing Regulations and Food
and Drug Administraton Implementation, 13 SW. U. L. REV. 531, 543 n.72 (1983).
109. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 420, 426 (1981).
110. This was especially true of the American Pharmaceutical Association and the American
Medical Association. Id.
111. Id.
112. Many of these businessmen felt that they would be put out of business by Federal
regulation. Wallace F. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law: How It Came; How It Works, 35
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 132, 134 (1980).
113. In 1883, Dr. Wiley became the chief chemist of the United States Department of
Agriculture. It was at this time that Dr. Wiley began his famous crusade to curb the then
widespread abuses in the production and sale of drugs, beginning with the expansion of studies by
department chemists. Dr. Wiley took the findings of the department to the public as a popular
speaker at business organizations and women's clubs. In 1903, Dr. Wiley captured the attention of
the nation by establishing a volunteer "poison squad" of young men who agreed to eat only foods
treated with measured amounts of chemical preservatives with the object of demonstrating their
effects on digestion and health. These experiments piqued the interest of popular song writers, who
immortalized them with lyrics such as:
0, they may get over it but they'll never look the xrne,
Tha kind of bill of n would drive moo men bueme.
Next week he'll give them nwothbatb, a 16 Newbugh or
0, they may get over it but they'll never took the .one.
By bringing popular attention to the issues of food and drug purity, Dr. Wiley was largely
responsible for the almost unanimous vote passing the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act. Wallace F.
Janssen, The U. S. Food and Drug Law: How it Came; How it Works, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
132, 133-35 (1980); Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and
Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 420, 420-26 (1981).
114. Gary L. Yingling, Does Self-Medication Have a Role in Our Society?, 36 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 604, 611 (1981).
115. Many manufacturers changed their formulas or dropped claims that appeared on the labels
of their prducts that could not be sustained in court. Id.
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1911. A divided Supreme Court"' held that although the law prohibited false
label statements about the identity or ingredients of the drugs, it did not prohibit
false health claims. 17
President Taft saw the danger created by this loophole and called on
Congress to remedy the situation."' In response to the President's appeal,
Congress passed the Sherley Amendment in 1912,"' which prohibited false
and fraudulent label claims of therapeutic effectiveness of drugs.'"
Unfortunately, the language of the Amendment required the prosecution to
prove that the promoter of a worthless drug had lied deliberately in order to
defraud the public, an impossibility in most cases." This loophole remained
for twenty-six years, preventing effective enforcement of the amendment. I"
While complying literally with the Sherley Amendment, many drug promoters
simply evaded it by transferring the false claims from product labels to
advertisements for the drug.'"
Although the 1906 Act was plagued by inadequacies,' 24 another tragedy
was necessary to catapult Congress into further action."n In 1937, a drug
company decided to market the new wonder drug sulfanilamide ' in liquid
rather than the usual tablet form.' Due to poor solubility in normal solvents,
116. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 495 (1911).
117. In the case of 'Dr. Johnson's Mild Combination Treatment for Cancer," Justice Holmes
wrote the decision for the Court that held that the defendant could not be prosecuted for making false
claims about his product even though he knew that its use would not result in the health claims he
made. Id. at 495-99.
118. The President said:
There are none so credulous as sufferers from disease. The need is urgent for
legislation that will prevent the raising of false hopes of speedy cures of serious ailments
by misstatements of facts as to worthless mixtures on which the sick will rely while their
disease progresses unchecked.
62 CONG. REc. 2380 (1911).
119. Ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912).
120. Id.
121. Wallace F. Janasen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG CosM L.J. 420, 428 (1981).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The Act operated post facto; the Food and Drug Administration lacked the authority for
pre-marketing approval and was limited to action alter a misbranded or adulterated item was
introduced into the marketplace. Dangerous drugs, therefore, had to reach the market before risks
became known to consumers or the FDA. Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug
Amendments of 1962: 7he Anatomy ofa Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARiz. ST. L.J. 581, 583 (1982).
125. Id.
126. Sulfanilamide was used to treat acute rheumatic fever, childbed fever and pneumonia.
MILTON SILVERMAN & PHiuP R. LEE, PILLS, PRoFrrs, & Pouixcs 6 (1974).
127. Id. at 86.
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such as water or alcohol, the manufacturer proceeded to dissolve sulfanilamide
in di-ethylene glycol.'" The company failed to perform tests on the safety of
the elixir or even to look up the toxicity of the solution in chemical
textbooks.'" People who drank the sulfanilamide elixir died soon
afterward." A doctor at the American Medical Association tracked the
source of the deaths to kidney damage caused by the di-ethylene glycol. 3'
Before all the bottles of the elixir could be tracked down and recalled," 3 at
least 107 people, many of them children, had died from the poisonous brew
Elixir Sulfanilamide. 33 Due to the limitations of the 1906 law, all that could
be done to the manufacturer was to penalize the manufacturer for misbranding
the product.'34
The sulfanilamide calamity provided the impetus necessary for Congress to
pass the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938."3s The new law expanded
the scope of the FDA and facilitated tighter enforcement of its regulations.'
36
The Act improved the regulations guarding against unsafe drugs by: prohibiting
interstate commerce in new drugs unless manufacturers furnished scientific proof
to the FDA of the new product's safety prior to marketing; eliminating proof of
fraud as a requirement to enjoin false claims for drugs; providing the FDA with
specific authority to inspect pharmaceutical production facilities; and authorizing
federal courts to restrain violations of the Act by injunctions.137  Therefore,
the primary focus of pharmaceutical regulation in the United States came to be
the assured safety of new drugs. This directive remained in effect until
128. Di-ethylene glycol is a key ingredient in automobile anti-freeze. When using this toxic
solvent in the Elixir Sulfanilamide, the drug manufacturer added a little coloring and raspberry flavor
to enhance the aesthetics of the elixir. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The human body metabolizes di-ethylene glycol into kidney-destroying oxalic acid, which
in turn causes a slow, agonizing and excruciatingly painful death. Id.
132. Part of the difficulty in tracking down all the bottles of the tainted drug came from the fact
that drug salesmen lied about their customers, druggists altered their records, and terrified physicians
crept into pharmacies at night to destroy their prescriptions. Id.
133. Id.
134. According to the law, an "elixir" is a solution containing ethyl alcohol. The solvent used,
di-ethylene glycol, is not an alcohol, and therefore the product was considered misbranded. The
manufacturer later told reporters, "[mly chemists and I deeply regret the fatal results, but... I do
not feel there was any responsibility on our part." The chief chemist committed suicide soon after
the incident. Id. at 87.
135. Ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988)).
136. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U. S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUO CosM. L.J. 420, 429 (1981).
137. Id.
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1962. 38
During the decades following World War I, profits for pharmaceutical
companies based in the United States soared.'" The pharmaceutical industry
and the FDA enjoyed a rather cordial relationship'' until, in 1959, Senator
Estes Kefauver"4' initiated hearings to investigate monopolistic pricing
practices of the pharmaceutical industry. 42 Although the initial thrust of
Senator Kefauver's legislation revolved around creating price competition in the
pharmaceutical industry,'" it eventually included a variety of other drug
138. For a detailed history of the 1962 Amendments, see Louis Lasagna, Congress, The FDA,
and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962, 32 PER P. BIOLOGY & MED. 322 (1989);
Note, The Drug Amendments of1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 101 (1963).
139. "By 1958 the industry's annual budget for research and development was estimated by
some to equal that of the National Institutes of Health ($140,000,000-modestby today's standards
of between $6 and $7 billion, but very respectable by the standards of the time)." Louis Lasagna,
Congress, The FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962, 32 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. 322, 323 (1989).
140. Id.
141. Senator Kefauver, a populist of independent mind, was one of the initiators of the petition
to censure Senator Joseph McCarthy. He also refused to sign the Southern Manifesto against civil
rights for blacks, and once cast the lone no vote during debate on a bill outlawing the Communist
party in the United States. Id.
142. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senator Kefauver began
his historic hearings in 1957 as an investigation of the drug, steel, automobile, and bread industries.
S. REP. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1961). Between December 1959 and April 1961, this
subcommittee concentrated on the economic structure of the drug industry. 107 CONG. REc. 5638
(1961). For the duration of the twenty-six month hearing investigating the drug industry alone,
Senator Kefauver's subcommittee generated 12,885 pages of testimony in government records.
Louis Lasagna, Congress, The FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962, 32
PERSP. BIbLOoY & MED. 322, 324 (1989).
143. Senator Kefauver advocated compulsory patent licensing for pharmaceutical companies.
Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a
Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 584 (1982). Although the Kefauver hearings were
not intended to increase the public's protection from unsafe drugs, other forces were concerned with
improving consumer protection. In 1969, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, Arthur Fleming, requested that the National Academy of Sciences National Research
Council review FDA procedures in an effort to protect the public health. Note, The Drug
Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 101, 103 (1963). In January
of 1961. Congreswoman Sullivan introduced H.R. 1235, an omnibus food, drug and cosmetic bill,
which attempted to close all major loopholes in the 1938 Act. H.R. 1235, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
107 CONG. Rac. 61 (1961). The House of Representatives' support of consumer protection was not
mirrored by the Senate, which held economics as its priority. Abraham Ribicoff, President
Kennedy's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, endorsed the general approach of S. 1552,
Kefauver's bill, but expressed concerns that S. 1552 failed to close up significant loopholes of the
1938 bill that the Secretary felt were important concerns to his department. Furthermore, Secretary
Ribicoff thought that the patent and anti-trust provisions of S. 1552 were outside the scope of his
office. Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 101,
104 (1963). Not surprisingly, after its introduction, S. 1552 was vehemently opposed by the
pharmaceutical industry. Id. at 106. This prompted the Kefauver subcommittee to launch a new
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regulation reforms, the most important of which required pre-marketing proof
of a drug's efficacy for its intended use.' 4 The FDA now imposes a two-step
burden of proof before approval of a new prescription drug: the drug must be
shown to be both safe and effective before it can be released into the
market. 45
As with the 1906 and the 1938 enactments, the 1959 efforts to revise the
drug laws faced vigorous opposition in Congress.'" But just as the legislation
seemed sure to die for lack of congressional support, the effort received a life-
saving boost from yet another drug disaster: the use of thalidomide47 by
pregnant women.'" Senator Kefauver's staff collected extensive information
on thalidomide that they strategically released, creating public outcry for more
stringent drug regulation."*  Congress responded by enacting the Drug
Amendments of 1962." ° It is ironic that the thalidomide scandal, which
vividly illustrated the need for increased safety measures, prompted the 1962
round of hearings which lasted from July 5, 1961 to Feb 7, 1962, which were marked by many
testimonials from affected and interested parties. Id. at 108. In May, 1961, Congressman Celler
introduced the House counterpart of S. 1552, dealing with quality control, drug effectiveness, new
drug clearance procedures, factory inspections, official names, advertising, and anti-biotic
certification. H.R. 6245, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., 107 CONG. REc. 5691 (1961). While the Senate
and the House deliberated their separate bills, the thalidomide crisis arose. Sensing the public's
outrage over this tragedy, President Kennedy made the recommendation that the House bill be
incorporated into the Kefauver bill. Consequently, the amended S. 1552 was passed on August 23,
1962. 108 CONG. REC. 17,422 (1962).
144. Catharine E. Bednar, A Constnational Analysis of Federal Drug Marketing Regulations
and Food and Drug Administration Implementation, 13 Sw. U. L. REv. 531, 544 (1983).
145. Id.
146. 108 CONG. REC. 16,413 (1962).
147. Introduced by a German firm, Chemie-Grlnenthal, thalidomide quickly won acceptance
as one of the safest sedatives available. Thalidomide produces a normal, refreshing sleep without
the morning grogginess usually associated with sedatives. Thalidomide was widely administered to
fretful infants. It was thought to be free from any significant side effects and seemed to be virtually
suicide-proof. MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS & POLITICS 94 (1974).
148. Use of thalidomide in Europe by pregnant women resulted in 3,500 to 5,000 cases of a
severe birth defect known as phocomelia, in which the baby's feet and hands are attached close to
its body like flippers. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2nd Seas. 40 (1962). Although it was not
approved by the FDA for marketing in the United States, thalidomide had been distributed by
William S. Merrell Co., thalidomide's manufacturer, to physicians for investigational purposes.
HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2ND SEss., REPORT ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S
PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS 8 (Comm. Print 1980). According to an FDA survey,
thalidomide was distributed to 3,897 women of child-bearing age in the United States. Nine gave
birth to malformed children. Arthur H. Hayes, Food and Drug Regulaion After 75 Years, 246
JAMA 1223, 1224 (1981).
149. 108 CONG. REC. 23,179-80 (1962).
150. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 301-394 (West Supp. 1992)).
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Amendments, which dealt primarily with issues of drug effectiveness."'5 In
fact, members of the 1962 Congress 52 also recognized that the 1962
Amendments provided no certainty of protection for the American public against
future thalidomide-like disasters.15 3
This historical investigation of drug regulation in the United States
illustrates the nature of this country's regulatory efforts, namely that legislation
occurs in an attempt to allay the public's fears stemming from an immediate and
narrow crisis. Regulations are vehemently enforced during the period of the
crisis, but once the public's fears fade, so does governmental interest. The
AIDS crisis has led to the promulgation of the latest set of FDA reforms in an
effort to calm the public's fears."'4
IV. PROBLEMS wrrH THE 1991 DRUG APPROVAL REFORMS
A. The 1991 Drug Approval Reforms
The FDA has recently implemented the most sweeping changes in the past
thirty years in the prescription drug approval process. 5  The President's
Council on Competitiveness has promulgated eleven specific reforms"6 in an
attempt to speed up the FDA's approval process for new prescription drugs.
These include: the use of external review,' expanded use of advisory
committees," an expanded role for Institutional Review Boards, flexible
151. Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of1962: The Anatomy
of a Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARIz. ST. LJ. 581, 584 (1982).
152. See 108 CONG. REC. 16,412 (1962) (remarks of Representative Sullivan).
153. Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenry-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD
DRUG COSM. LJ. 458, 464 (1986).
154. The FDA has come under increasing attack in recent years for its languid pace of bringing
new and important drugs to the marketplace, particularly in the context of the growing AIDS
epidemic. See Marlene Cimons, FDA Likely to Speed Approval of New Drugs, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at Al.
155. FDA Set to Speed Drug Approvals, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1991, § 1, at 8.
156. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,617.
157. External review entails the use of experts outside the government to conduct clinical
reviews for Investigational New Drugs. The goal of external review is to lessen the need for the
FDA to conduct its own investigation on the clinical data. Id. at 43,620.
158. The FDA will be using advisory committees to assist reviewing divisions in monitoring
the progress of New Drug Applications (NDAs). Advisory committee expertise will be used in the
early stages in development and execution of clinical testing. Id. at 43,621.
159. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) provide assistance to the FDA in designing and
reviewing clinical studies, especially in respect to ethical issues and informed consent. This
proposition would allow IRBs to make decisions regarding initial human testing. Id.
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interpretation of the efficacy standard,' accelerated approval, '' expanded
use of foreign data and recognition of foreign approvals in the United
States," enhanced computerization," establishment of a classification
system for application priorities,'" the use of internal systems of
accountability, reduction of excessive liability costs,'" and the direction
of staff and financial resources toward new drug review. ' 7
Most of these recommendations have been adopted by the FDA as official
policy'" and are believed by some to be the method to finally clear the FDA's
160. This calls for the FDA to make a deliberate effort to interpret the statutory requirement
of efficacy in a manner which factors into it the risks to human life and health that may result from
delaying the introduction of the new drug. This means that instead of applying the same strict
standard to all new drugs, the FDA will balance the need for the drug against the drug's
effectiveness. Id.
161. The FDA will reduce the number of clinical studies required prior to a new drug's
approval as well as the amount of time the FDA takes to approve drugs which are used to treat life-
threatening, very serious or severely debilitating diseases. Id. at 43,622.
162. This calls for the FDA to develop with foreign countries: common standards for clinical
studies; common format for submission of drug approval applications; common sets of requirements
for animal testing; criteria for plant inspections and good manufacturing practices; and a reciprocity
for approvals. It also calls for the FDA to accept foreign data used for approval of drugs whenever
possible. Id. at 43,623.
163. The FDA will develop a plan to fully computerize new drug applications. Id. at 43,624.
164. The FDA will adopt a new system of classification for all new drug applications. The new
system will consist of two categories: "routine" and "expedited." In each category, the priority
of review will be based on a "first in, first reviewed" principle. The FDA's current system
prioritizes drugs having the greatest potential therapeutic benefits. The existing system does not
consider the economic impact of a drug. Id. at 42,524-25.
165. The FDA will adopt internal management systems to: help monitor every application's
progress for each product submitted; and measure the application's progress against a timetable
based on statutory standards; and substantially reduce the use of clinical holds of investigationsl new
drug applications as well as closely monitoring the duration of clinical holds. The term "clinical
hold" refers to the authority of the FDA to delay for reasons of safety the beginning of early clinical
trials conducted on investigational new drugs. Id. at 43,625.
166. The administration supports efforts to exempt drug manufacturers from punitive damages
when the FDA has approved the drug. Id.
167. To improve the capability of the institution to review new drugs, the FDA will prioritize
first the hiring of new drug review staff in the areas most in need of staffing, especially in the
biotechnology area. Id. at 43,626.
168. The FDA issued new guidelines on the process of approving drugs. These guidelines
substantially incorporate the recommendations from the Council on Competitiveness. Two of the
most controversial suggestions were dropped from the new guidelines. The suggestions not included
involve a plan to fully coordinate the United States' drug approval with foreign countries including
acceptance of foreign approvals for new drugs. The other unaccepted suggestion would have
enabled individuals outside the FDA to authorize initial small-scale, human safety testing of new
drugs. New FDA Approval Guidelines Set, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIGEST, May 14, 1992,
at 353, Cl.
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clogged approval system of new prescription drugs."6 The omnibus goals
adopted by the Administration declare that by 1994 the FDA will have reduced
the average development and approval time for all new drugs by 3.75 years, will
have reduced the average development time for therapies used to treat serious
or life threatening diseases by forty-five percent," ° and will have reduced the
average development for all other therapies by twenty-five percent.""'
B. Opposition
Not everyone is as optimistic as Vice President Quayle about these reforms,
however. Senator Edward Kennedy, Congressman John Dingell, and
Congressman Henry Waxman wrote a joint letter to the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs asserting that the new recommendations would cause the FDA to
abdicate its statutory responsibility to make key decisions on the safety and
efficacy of drugs."7  Although the legislators endorsed the intent of the
changes, they said the agency's plan to contract with external experts to aid in
reducing the backlog of new drug applications "would undermine the very
purpose for which [the FDA) was created and that it is uniquely qualified to
fulfill--the protection of the American public from unsafe and ineffective
drugs."" Other members of Congress have also expressed concern over the
new reforms.'7 4
Charles Edwards, former FDA Commissioner, agrees with the congressmen
that the reforms will diminish the autonomy of the FDA. According to Mr.
169. Vice President Quayle commented:
The Administration's major reforms in the FDA's drug approval process will cut
years off the review process. They will also save millions of lives and billions of
dollars. Under these reforms, patients with serious and life threatening diseases will
benefit from earlier access to important new drugs. Unnecessary regulatory burdens
will be eased.
Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,618.
170. The FDA will have reduced the average development time of therapies for serious diseases
by approximately five and one half years. Id.
171. The FDA will have reduced the average development time of other therapies by
approximately seven years. Id.
172. The congressmen stated that by allowing private contractors to review the safety and
efficacy of drugs, permitting the United States to accept drug approvals of foreign governments, and
using private review boards, the FDA was raising serious concerns, including the prospect of
inconsistent standards and the possibility that commercial interests might override scientific
objectivity. Council on Competitiveness Recommendations Prompt Concern, [1990-91 Transfer
Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) J 42,611, at 1520 (March 30, 1992).
173. Malcolm Gladwell, Critics Say New FDA ProceduresforApproing Drugs Would Weaken
Agency, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991, § 1, at A3.
174. Congressman Ted Weiss has also expressed misgivings about several sections of the
reforms. Ronald Begley, The Jury Is Still Out On FDA Reforms, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 12, 1992,
at 24.
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Edwards, a strengthening rather than a weakening of the FDA is the only means
by which the drug approval process can be effectively accelerated. " Dr.
Sidney Wolfe, director of the Public Citizen Health Research Group, also
expresses concern that the new reforms could possibly yield a significant risk
because of the dangers that may have been overlooked in the abbreviated process
without a balancing benefit to patients.'76
C. Weaknesses in the 1991 Reforms
1. Time Delays
The first three reforms all call for expanded use of external review. The
FDA will contract with experts to assist in the clinical review of new drugs,'"
extend its use of advisory committees, and augment the role of Institutional
Review Boards 7". Under the current FDA system, drug sponsors prepare
175. The head of a recent panel to reform the FDA, Charles Edwards, calls the new reforms
"a lot of nonsense." Id.
176. Dr. Sidney Wolfe recognizes the potential benefits to pharmaceutical companies because
their products would be on the market earlier, giving them a more competitive advantage over other
drugs. It seems ironic for the FDA to put forth changes that will promise greater benefit to industry
than to the health of the American public. Marlene Cimons, FDA Likely to Speed Approval of New
Drugs, Los ANGELE TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at Al.
177. Qualified external review organizations will be contracted by the FDA to conduct clinical
reviews from classes of pharmaceuticals where backlogged applications have been pending more than
the statutory 180 days. This external review organization will certify that it has evaluated the data,
as well as give an opinion as to whether the data satisfies the statutory requirements of safety and
efficacy. Although the FDA need not conduct its own analyses of the data, it retains the right to
fully review the clinical data of the external reviews as well as the right to perform its own review
when there is an indication that the external review has not been properly performed. Moreover,
the FDA will retain its authority to make the final decision to approve the drug if it meets the
statutory requirements for safety and efficacy. The FDA will pay for external review from
discretionary funds. It will certify and monitor three or more external organizations, which it deems
qualified, to conduct an independent review of clinical data. The external review builds upon
current practice; the FDA contracts with outside experts to assist in the clinical review of new drugs,
as well as relying on Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to grant Investigationsl New Drugs (INDs).
Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,620.
178. The FDA will phase in the expanded use of advisory committees to assist in monitoring
the progress of New Drug Applications and Product License Applications for biologics. Advisory
committees will be used to advise drug sponsors about the design and the number of clinical studies
necessary to test Investigational New Drugs (INDs). Advisory committee expertise will, therefore,
be tapped by the FDA earlier in the development and the execution of human clinical testing. Id.
at 43,621.
179. Previously, both the FDA and the Investigational Review Board had to review the
Investigational New Drugs before continuing beyond initial testing. Reform number three, however,
permits sponsors of new drugs to submit their applications for INDs to the appropriate IRB for
approval without requiring additional agency review. Id. at 43,621.
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data about the technical sections"s of New Drug Applications (NDAs). This
data includes summaries of each section of the application as well as an overall
summary of the application provided by the pharmaceutical industry.' These
data are similar to the reviews that will be generated by external experts under
the new reforms.'12
Although the summaries from drug sponsors follow standard
guidelines,t 3 they are presently given little attention by FDA reviewers.' "
FDA reviewers consider the summaries produced by outside sources as
impersonal and colorless in style, lacking in detail, exhibiting discordance
between summaries and test reports or results, failing to address problem areas
candidly, lacking expertise in writing style and argument, and possibly
biased.'' Furthermore, FDA reviewers prefer to create their own impressions
of the New Drug Application (NDA) from their individual study of the reports
or by the time-consuming method of re-analyzing test results.'"
It is unlikely that the 1991 Reforms will have any effect on these common
practices by FDA reviewers. The Reforms fail to address the grounds for
objection by which FDA reviewers justify their frequent rejection of external
data, with the possible exception of sponsor bias. Under the Reforms, the FDA
retains the right to fully review the clinical data of an external review" 7 and
will certainly continue to exercise that right.
The Commissioner and the staff of the FDA ultimately bear the
responsibility for their approval decisions.ss The role of external experts
must legally remain an advisory one.'" If an FDA official approves a drug
which later proves to be unsafe,"g that official is the one who is held
180. Technical sections include clinical or human data, pharmacology-toxicology or animal
data, chemistry, statistics, biopharmaceutics, and (for antibiotics) microbiology. Barret Scoville,
Shifting the Burden: Restructuring the Drug Review Process, 49 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTIcS 229, 230 (1991).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. The standard process consists of a reviewer documenting the evaluation of each section
of the application with a ten to sixty page written report. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. The reviewers at the FDA spend weeks, even months, resummarizing material that has
already been summarized. Barren Scoville, Shifting the Burden: Restructuring the Drug Review
Process, 49 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPETICS 229, 230 (1991).
187. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,620.
188. Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962,
32 PutsP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 337 (1989).
189. Id. at 336.
190. For example, thalidomide.
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responsible for releasing that drug to the public.' On the other hand, if the
official errs on the side of safety and withholds approval, no one learns of the
loss, let alone who is responsible for the loss to society of a beneficial new
drug.1
9 2
A recent Supreme Court decision"' against the FDA provides even
further incentive for the FDA to become even more cautious, rigorous, and
time-consuming in its approval of new prescription drugs. In Berkovitz v.
United States,' 94 the Supreme Court limited liability protection for a
government agency that failed to comply with its own regulatory standards. "9
The FDA claimed that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)"' protected the
FDA on the grounds that their approval of the vaccine constituted "discretionary
duty," therefore making the FDA exempt from liability in the suit." The
191. Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962,
32 PERsp. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 336 (1989).
192. Former FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt aptly expressed this dilemma faced by the
FDA:
For example, in all the FDA's history, I am unable to find a single instance where
a congressional committee investigated the failure of the FDA to approve a new drug.
But, the times when hearings have been held to criticize our approval of new drugs have
been so frequent that we aren't able to count them.. . . The message of FDA staff
could not be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug is resolved in favor of
approval, the Agency and the individuals involved likely will be investigated. Whenever
such a drug is disapproved, no inquiry will be made. The congressional pressure for
our negative action on new drug applications is, therefore, intense.
HAROLD GRABOWSKI, DRUG REoULATION AND INNOVATION 76 (1976) (quoting speech by
Alexander Schmidt before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. (October 29, 1974)). Nor
can the FDA be overly cautious, according to congressional standards. When the FDA approved
propranolol for the treatment of angina in 1973, the drug had already been approved for this use in
Britain for seven years. Propranolol was so effective in the treatment of angina that United States
physicians had been prescribing propranolol for the treatment of angina even before FDA approval.
In spite of rare international consensus on propranolol's efficacy in treating angina, a congressional
oversight committee severely chastised the FDA for approving the drug without sufficient evidence
of effectiveness even though the FDA had relied upon over a dozen studies in approving the NDA.
See Louis Lasagna & William M. Wardell, The FDA, Politics, and the Public, 232 JAMA 141, 141
(1975); Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974).
193. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
194. Id.
195. A child contracted a severe case of polio after ingesting an oral vaccine for polio. The
child sued the Bureau of Biologics of the FDA for releasing that particular batch of vaccine to the
public. Id. at 533.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
197. The FTCA generally authorizes suits against the United States
for monetary damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
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Court, however, held that the discretionary function exception of the FTCA does
not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow."W
Because FDA employees follow regulations governing the drug approval
process, they remain legally liable for consequential mishaps occurring from
their actions." When a suit charges an agency with failure to act in
accordance with a mandatory directive, liability will attach. m' This precedent
dictates even more apprehensive approval of new drugs by the FDA, resulting
in a greater time delay in bringing a new prescription drug to market in the
United States.
Reform number three,"' which calls for the expanded use of Institutional
Review Boards (IRB), merely reiterates present FDA policy. The FDA's use
of IRBs to review and approve applications for Investigational New Drugs
(INDs) has been in effect since 19 87 .' However, the research
community' failed to respond to the FDA's opportunities to become part of
a review board because researchers are apprehensive of potential liability
problems stemming from their involvement with the FDA. '  Top FDA
officials doubt whether researchers will respond any more enthusiastically to an
expansion of opportunities to join IRBs because liability still exists.2
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
The Act includes a number of exceptions to this broad waiver of sovereign immunity. The exception
relevant to this case provides that no liability shall lie for
[alny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
198. Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988).
199. Id. at 538.
200. Id.
201. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,621.
202. IRBs Would Have Authority to Approve Investigational New Drug Applications Under
Competitive Council Plan, FDC REP. (THE BLUE SHEET), Nov. 20, 1991, at 6.
203. The President's Council for Competitiveness recommends that the FDA choose its outside
reviewers from the qualified experts in the research community, identified as large statistical
research companies, private industry consulting organizations, universities (coalitions of pharmacy,
medical, and public health schools), FDA and/or drug industry retirees, private physicians and other
experts experienced in conducting clinical investigations, and new private entities. Id.
204. Id.
205. Although one of the new reforms is aimed at reducing excess liability costs, this reduction
applies only to pharmaceutical manufacturers, not the reviewers. Recommendations, supra note 13,
at 43,625.
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The use of external experts by the FDA has also been realistically inhibited
by the restrictive interpretation of the federal conflict-of-interest statute* that
prohibits government employees from participating in decisions in which they
have a financial interest. This extends to the FDA's Advisory Committee
members, and would therefore significantly reduce the field of experts available
to fill advisory positions proposed by the 1991 reforms because many such
experts are employed by pharmaceutical companies. X
7
Under the new reforms to be implemented by the FDA, FDA personnel
remain ultimately and legally responsible for their decision to approve new
drugs." Cases such as Berkovitz" ensure continuation of the slow pace
of the FDA in approving new prescription drugs. The cost of releasing an
unsafe or unacceptable drug into the marketplace is high, and the FDA staff will
logically continue to judge the data they receive with caution. Not only does
liability ensure that FDA staff members move along conservative paths toward
new drug approval, but it also acts to repel the research community from
involvement in the drug approval process. 2 0
The FDA has already decided to reject the proposal that allowed IRBs to
authorize small-scale, human safety testing of new drugs.21 This proposal
met such strong opposition that-the FDA decided against implementing a plan
that removed responsibility from the FDA in new drug trials involving human
subjects. 212
The new reforms lack any relief from liability, which will help to ensure
that the individuals responsible for making the decisions at the FDA will
206. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1988).
207. See PROBLEMS INVOLVING FEDERAL CONFLICTOF INTEREST RESTRICTIONS ON MEMBERS
OF FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND AGENCY OFFICIALS (Center for the Study of Drug
Development, Publication No. PS 8032 (1980)).
208. Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962,
32 PERsp. BIoLoGY & MED. 322, 337 (1989).
209. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
210. Some members of the research community feel that the FDA would be exposing members
of the IRBs to substantial liability if the drug approved by the IRB was later found to have harmful
effects. IRBs Would Have Authority to Approve Investigational New Drug Applications Under
Competitive Council Plan, FDC REP. (rHE BLUE SHEEr), Nov. 20, 1991, at 6.
211. Malcolm Gladwell, FDA Implements Changes in Drug Approval Process, WASH. POST,
April 10, 1992, at A2.
212. FDA Oncology and Pulmonary Drugs Division Medical Reviewer, Grant Williams,
maintained that independent reviews of initial human testing by IREBs would endanger the safety of
the subjects. Mr. Williams found that in numerous cases IRBs overlooked many dangers that were
found by the FDA when intervening in the IRBs' reviewing process. IRB Review ofInvestigational
New Drug Applications Would Be Dangerous, FDA Medical Reviewer Contends, FDC REP. (THE
BLUE SHEET), Dec. 4, 1991, at 3.
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continue to spend valuable time, money, and other resources needlessly
reproducing summaries and reviews in an effort to remain as faultless as
possible.213 The 1991 FDA reforms fail to adequately address these issues and
these pressing problems will, therefore, continue unabated.
Another weakness not addressed by the 1991 Reforms is the sheer bulk of
paperwork involved in the approval process for new prescription drugs.2"4 An
application for a new drug can be 100,000 pages or more.2"5 Not only do the
reforms fail to reduce the length, in time and pages, of the drug application
process, but reforms, such as those creating a classification system and
establishing an internal system of accountability," 6 will invariably add to the
huge quantity of paperwork faced by FDA officials. The Reforms promise to
reduce the average approval time by 3.75 years,2 17 but because most of the
time-consuming obstacles have been left in place, it is unlikely that such
progress will be made.2"'
2. Costs
A very practical limitation in the 1991 FDA reforms is the issue of
economics. The only reform directly addressing the issue of cost is the reform
calling for decreased liability costs.219  However, this reform may be the
weakest of them all because it calls for support to pass Senate Bill 640, the
"Products Liability Fairness Act. " ' Senate Bill 640 includes a provision
which would exempt drug manufacturers from punitive damages if a drug had
FDA approval." A simple call for support of a Senate bill surely falls short
of real reform. Nor do punitive damage awards account for the bulk of costs
incurred by drug sponsors bringing a new prescription drug to market.
The current system of prescription drug approval is not only costly to
manufacturers,' but the cumbersome method followed by the FDA is also
213. See supra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
214. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,624-25.
215. David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About Improvements at FDA, 70
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEws 28, 28 (1992). This is an astounding amount of information,
especially when one considers that the Code of Federal Regulations, complete with 196 paperback
volumes, contains only 122,090 pages. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 168 (3rd ed.
1991).
216. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,624-25.
217. Id. at 43,618.
218. See supra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
219. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,625.
220. Id.
221. S. 640 would exempt drug manufacturers from punitive damages in a drug product liability
case when the drug has FDA approval. Id.
222. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
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costly for the agency itself. Several reforms 2W require expenditure of
nonexistent funds. For instance, the Gramm-Rudman Act has forced the FDA
to lay off over 1200 staff members2 ' from 1979 to 1986.'2 The FDA did
not regain its previous level of staff until 1991, when the number of FDA
employees rose to 8400.' Although Congress has proposed to increase the
1993 FDA budget to $797 million, 2' numerous monetary problems remain.'
Over the past five years Congress has heaped new responsibilities on the FDA
without providing the increase of funds necessary to carry out these greater
duties. 2 9
Meanwhile, areas needing attention by the FDA, such as biotechnology
innovation are burgeoning.' The FDA has managed to approve only fourteen
biotechnical medicines in the past nine years."l There are currently over 130
biotechnical medicines being tested, revealing a growth of over sixty percent in
the last four years. 2 Furthermore, the FDA approved only a single medicine
produced by biotechnology in 1990, and only two biotechnical medications in
1991." Congress has recently sent a message to the FDA that increased
surveillance in the drug and device industries is needed. 4
223. Reforms such as those calling for enhanced computerization of the FDA's drug approval
process, direction of human and financial resources toward new drug review, establishment of
internal sources of accountability, and expansion of external review all require expenditure of funds.
Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,620-26.
224. This figure constituted fifteen percent of the total FDA staff. Gerald F. Meyer, The
Impact of Gramm-Rudman Legislation on FDA, 42 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 155, 155 (1987).
225. Id. The FDA staff fell from over 8000 employees in 1979 to less than 7000 in 1987. Ann
Gibbons, Can David Kessler Revive the FDA?, 252 SCIENCE 200, 203 (1991).
226. Id.
227. FDA Human Drugs Program Allocated $204 Mil. in FY 1993, Up 4.4%, Under Bush
Administration Request; FDA's Total Budget Set at $797 Mil. for 1993, FDC REP. (THE PINK
SHEET), Feb. 3, 1992, at 13.
228. Gerald F. Meyer, The Impact of Gramm-Rudman Legislation on FDA, 42 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 155, 156 (1987).
229. In the past, Congress has required that the FDA hasten approvals of more generic
medicines and drugs for rare diseases. Unfortunately, when Congress did consider giving the FDA
more money, the General Accounting Office stated that poor accounting methods within the FDA
made it impossible to determine where the resoures were needed most. Ann Gibbons, Can David
Kessler Revive the FDA ?, 252 SCIENCE 200, 200 (1991).
230. David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About Improvements at FDA, 70
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEwS 28, 29 (1992).
231. FDA Slow on Biotechnology Approvals, 69 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWs 14, 14
(1991).
232. Id.
233. David Hanson, Pharmaceutical Industry Optimistic About Improvements at FDA, 70
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEws 28, 29 (1992).
234. William D. Appler & Gaile L. McMann, FDA in the 1990s, NS30 AM. PHARMACY 27,
32 (1990).
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Although the 1991 Reforms propose that the first priority of FDA resources
will be dedicated to new drug approval,235 substantial resources will actually
have to be diverted away from the drug approval process and channeled toward
traditional oversight and enforcement activities.236 With such tight budgetary
constraints and ever increasing responsibilities, the FDA is unlikely to be
capable of meeting the financial demands of the 1991 Reforms.
3. Safety
The FDA has already rejected the 1991 Drug Approval Reform's
suggestion to accept foreign drug approvals as primary evidence of a new drug's
safety.237 However, the idea of harmonizing the FDA drug approval process
with other countries may be a possibility.
A 1991 modification calls for the FDA to place a "very high priority" on
harmonizing the FDA drug approval system with other industrialized countries
in order to facilitate the FDA's recognition of foreign approval of new
drugs.' The reforms also suggest that when reviewing a drug approved
elsewhere the FDA should capitalize on the resources spent by other countries
and, whenever possible, forego unnecessary repetition of clinical trials.239
However, this reform represents no change from past FDA procedure.'
There has never been any regulation barring the use of foreign research data in
the United States.
24
'
What has prevented the FDA from utilizing foreign data in the past has
been the FDA's concern for safety. 2 As a matter of policy, the FDA, with
certain exceptions, requires at least one clinical investigation to be performed by
a competent and recognized domestic investigator.1 3 Almost fifty percent of
the NDAs for new molecular entities approved between 1974 and 1978 contained
reports of studies done in other countries. 4 The FDA generally accepts
foreign trials without much concern if they merely confirm domestically derived
235. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,626.
236. William D. Appler & Gaile L. McMann, FDA in the 1990s, NS30 Am. PHARMACY 27,
32 (1990).
237. New FDA Approval Guidelines Set, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, May 14,1992,
at 353, Cl.
238. Recommendations, supra note 13, at 43,623.
239. Id.
240. Jerome A. Halperin, From Investigation to Marketplace: Moving Drugs Through the
System, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 166, 169 (1981).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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research data.Y
However, problems arise when foreign clinical data is pivotal to FDA
approval.' Despite the FDA's public posture regarding foreign trial data, the
FDA rarely accepts foreign data as primary evidence, even when the foreign
trials appear absolutely impeccable.Y7  The FDA resists acceptance of
scientific data even from most European countries,' and it is standard policy
for the FDA to require randomized, controlled clinical trials to be repeated
within the United States before a new drug can be approved.' Consensus
among experts is rare, but scientists and leaders of the pharmaceutical industry
strongly agree that such replication is wasteful and undesirable.' However,
obstacles inherent to the attitudes of FDA staff members, such as those
discussed in this section, prevent the FDA from more readily accepting foreign
research data.
The FDA identifies numerous safety barriers to the use of foreign research
data, including the Agency's lack of familiarity with foreign languages,"
Europe's shorter historical commitment to modem, controlled, high-quality
245. Louis Lasagna, On Reducing Waste in Foreign Clinical Trials and Postregulation
Erperience, 40 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 369, 370 (1986).
246. Id.
247. Louis Lasagna, Congress, The FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962,
32 PERsP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 337 (1989). The quality of much foreign data is high because
the pharmaceutical industry is dominated by multinational corporations who recognize the importance
of the United States as a market, providing strong incentives for major companies to guarantee that
trials conducted in other countries will meet the standards of the FDA. In spite of this, the FDA
has continually refused to approve a drug's safety based solely on foreign data. Harvey Teff, Drug
Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 567, 584 (1985).
248. Louis Lasagna, Congress, The FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962,
32 PEsP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 337 (1989).
249. Id.
250. Replication of efficacy and safety in human clinical trials requires the investigators to
merely corroborate the conclusions already established by foreign studies. Therefore,
pharmaceutical companies are barred from running creative experiments in order to discover novel
information about the new drug. For example, the effects of different doses or dose intervals, the
effects in different populations, the effects of interactions between drugs, and the effects of drug-
disease interactions. The FDA's refusal to accept foreign clinical trials clearly inhibits innovation
in drug research. Louis Lasagna, On Reducing Waste in Foreign Clinical Trials and Postregulation
Experience, 40 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 369, 369 (1986). On agreement
between experts See generally Louis Lasagna, Consensus Among Experts: The Unholy Grail,
Summer PEIlsP. BIOLOGY & MED. 537 (1976).
251. Louis Lasagna, On Reducing Waste in Foreign Clinical Trials and Postregulaion
Experience, 40 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 369, 369 (1986).
Kassel: Getting There First With the Best:  The Need to Shorten the Presc
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1992
124 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
trials, 2 unease about validating foreign data," perceived poor design of
foreign experiments, 2' and an extraordinarily high level"'5 of statistical
problems.' " These safety barriers remain unchanged by the 1991 Reforms.
It is unlikely that a simple statement, issued without substantiation, will bring
the FDA to disregard their concerns about the safety of data produced abroad.
Reciprocity among nations in approving new drugs would certainly reduce
the time and expense involved in approving new drugs, but variations
traditionally and naturally occurring between United States and foreign research
standards make reciprocity unlikely. These problems include the facts that:
foreign protocols are traditionally less detailed than American protocols in terms
of judgment and measurement of efficacy; 7 foreign research investigators are
unaccustomed to being closely monitored through recorded data; '  foreign
researchers credited with impressive publications and academic credentials are
often least responsive to discipline from their sponsors; 9 human interpretation
of statistical norms and computer programs differ across cultures; 2' foreign
companies have difficulty accepting FDA standards as truly necessary; 2"' and
the trial report document in other countries contains less data than in the United
States. 2 All of these shortcomings of foreign research cause the FDA to be
concerned about the safety of a foreign approved drug for the United States
market.
252. Id. at 370. Rejection of Europe's medical research standards lies directly in conflict with
the FDA's idealistic proposal that it identify two or three key countries the FDA believes to have
safety and efficacy standards in line with the FDA's own. Recommendations, supra note 13, at
43,623.
253. The FDA maintains that it has no way of knowing what was discarded from the foreign
data base. Louis Lasagna, On Reducing Waste in Foreign Clinical Trials and Postregulaion
Experience, 40 CUNICAL PHARMAcoLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 369, 370 (1986).
254. Id.
255. These problems include high drop-out rates, ill-defined criteria of effectiveness, and lack
of knowledge of what was discarded from the data base. Id.
256. Id.
257. Foreign methods for testing are usually less detailed in reporting what laboratory tests are
to be performed than similar American tests. Also, foreign protocols traditionally fail to detail
variables such as criteria for judging efficacy. Id.
258. In particular, European testing seldom audits report forms against raw data in the
physician's office. Id.
259. Id.
260. For example, patients who are dropped from the study may include patients who begin the
study and then fail to complete the study. Id.
261. Foreign companies find it difficult to accept the need for the full plethora of statistical
analysis called for by the FDA in the United States. This analysis includes: an intent to treat
analysis; a subgroup analysis of patients who meet most of the inclusive criteria; a group of subjects
whose data are impeccable; and whatever additional analysis is required by the FDA statistician.
Id.
262. Id.
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United States pharmaceutical companies, realizing that they must abide by
the FDA's attitudes, have responded by simply repeating every foreign study,
whether the original studies were conducted by their own foreign subsidiaries
or some other firm.' The 1991 Reforms fail to address these problems.
Until foreign data meets FDA standards, the FDA will continue to reject foreign
data as primary evidence toward the approval of new prescription drugs in the
United States.
The recommendations by the President's Council on Competitiveness do not
constitute reforms; they are merely a reiteration of current FDA policy.2'
Although foreign data will continue to be accepted as supplementary in the
approval of new drugs, they will replace neither originally domestic
investigations nor the FDA's demand for replication of foreign data in the
United States. Regardless of the 1991 Reforms, foreign studies will not play the
expanded role of primary evidence on which approval would be granted. All
of the numerous barriers by which the FDA has historically justified its cautious
rejection of foreign research data remain in place today. These barriers have
not been eliminated by the 1991 Reforms.
The time delay between the discovery and the marketing of a new
prescription drug, the costs of developing a new drug, and the processes to
ensure safe and effective drugs, which have historically plagued the FDA, will
continue with no abatement from the 1991 Reforms. If the FDA is to succeed
at alleviating these problems, a different solution must be implemented.
V. SOLUTION
A method by which the approval process for new prescription drugs could
be sped up and costs lessened, while maintaining safety and efficacy standards,
would include the following three steps: elimination of unnecessary animal and
human studies, " limited initial marketing through approved hospital
pharmacies, 2' and a mandatory reporting system of all drug interactions.'
Other countries benefit from a post-marketing surveillance system of prescription
drugs. 2' For example, Great Britain's drug approval system places greater
emphasis on post-market surveillance rather than the more restrictive pre-
263. Id.
264. Many of the measures adopted by the FDA in response to the 1991 Drug Approval
Reforms were already being used in connection with AIDS drugs. FDA Releases New So-So Rules
for Drugs, NATIONAL PUBUC RADIO, April 9, 1992.
265. See infr notes 272-306 and accompanying text.
266. See infra part V.B.
267. See infra notes 307-331 and accompanying text.
268. W;LuAM M. WARDELL & LOUiS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 77
(1975).
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marketing surveillance system used in the United States.' The difference in
the approval rate of new prescription drugs is dramatic.' For example,
between the years 1962 and 1971, Great Britain had nearly four times as many
drugs exclusively available and twice as many years of prior availability of new
drugs as the United States.'
A. Elimination of Unnecessary Studies
By the time a new drug has reached the required FDA stage of extensive
testing in higher level animalsm and humans, the drug is already known to be
safe and effective.' These tests may take as long as seven years, cost tens
of millions of dollars, and are primarily performed to determine side effects and
dosage levels? 4  Yet, the FDA's prescription drug approval process places
a high priority on lengthy and expensive animal testing as well as extensive
clinical trials using human subjects prior to approval.s
Moreover, toxicity testing in animals can never guarantee a drug's safety
in humans? 6  For example, thalidomide passed rigorous animal tests before
being marketed abroad, showing no negative side effects in mice, rats, or
hamsters.' Only after thalidomide was found to produce severe congenital
birth defects in humans did retroactive testing find a single animal species that
269. The organization in Great Britain, which is concerned with the quality, safety, and
effectiveness of new drugs, is the Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM). After a new drug
is approved for marketing, the CSM conducts postmarketing surveillance through a card system.
When a patient reports an adverse effect from a drug to a doctor, the doctor fills out a card and
mails it to the CSM. This enables the CSM to identify patterns of adverse reactions and take the
appropriate action. John P. Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases:
Desperate 71mes Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REV. 925, 932-33 (1991).
270. Id.
271. WILLUAM M. WARDELL & LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 77
(1975).
272. These include animals such as dogs and primates. Id.
273. Id. at 137-39.
274. Id.
275. See generally Louis Lasagna, Congress, 7he FDA, and New Drug Development: Before
and After 1962, 32 PERsP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322 (1989).
276. Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 458, 464 (1986). European countries, such as Great Britain, demand only six-
month animal studies in two separate species whereas the United States requires the same tests to
be at least twelve months in length.
A. Alister Dunning, Regulation, New Drug Development, and the Question of Delay, 41 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 139, 139 (1986).
277. Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FooD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 458, 461 (1986).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [1992], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss1/3
1992] GETTING THERE FIRST WITH THE BEST 127
paralleled the human teratogeny. 2  Suitable animal models are difficult to
find' simply because other species do not share physiological attributes with
human beings.'
Extensive pre-marketing animal testing may prove to be of little or no
value, given both the limited ability to extrapolate from animals to humanity and
the variations in the effects of drugs on different animals and species."I One
study of six chemically dissimilar drugs that had been tested extensively in dogs,
rats, and humans showed that animal testing failed to reveal more than fifty
percent of the toxic side effects in human beings.m Studies also show that at
least twenty percent of the positive predictions for toxicity and side effects in
animals proved to be false in human beings.28
For example, Sir Alexander Fleming claimed that the penicillin project was
successful although he never tested the drug on animals.' In fact, had animal
tests been performed, penicillin would have never made it past the FDA's
current approval process. Penicillin kills guinea pigs and is highly toxic to other
laboratory animals, but remains one of the most useful and powerful drugs
available.'m One commentator has observed that the loss of even one drug
such as penicillin due to excessively stringent animal testing requirements would
harm more people than all of the drug toxicity in the history of modern drug
development. '
There is no need to eliminate all animal testing. By instituting a tightly
monitored system of post-marketing surveillance, animal testing requirements
could be used without making them broader than necessary to protect the
humans in the initial release of the prescription drug.
The present system of drug approval includes overly extensive and
278. Teratogeny is the production of abnormal organisms. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2358 (1981).
279. "Of the numerous species of rabbits eventually tested for the effects of thalidomide on the
fetus, only the New Zealand white rabbit was shown to be susceptible in the same way as the human
fetus." Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 567,
577 (1985).
280. Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 Food
Drug Cosm. LJ. 458, 464 (1986).
281. Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 Am. J. Comp. L. 567,
577 (1985).
282. WILitAM M. WARDELL & Louis LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 138
(1975).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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misguided clinical studies in human beings as well. Clinical trials in human
beings occur in three phases. In Phase I studies, the drug is introduced into a
small group of healthy human volunteers for a short period of time.' Phase
I investigations primarily focus' on drug safety.' The FDA uses Phase
I testing in order to prevent toxic compounds from reaching large groups of the
population.2  Later stages of testing in humans are used mainly to determine
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects; information which could be more
efficiently gathered under the proposed solution."'
Symptomatic patients are first administered a new drug in Phase II
testing.' Phase II investigations monitor the drug's safety in a larger group
of patients than Phase I testing. 3  Phase II testing also provides an
opportunity for preliminary evaluations of efficacy.' However, these trials
are still limited to small numbers of patients.' In fact, sponsors purposely
limit Phase II trials to the smallest number of participants necessary to obtain
scientifically valid results. 6
Phase III testing is usually the final stage of human clinical testing." By
now the new drug is known to be a safe and effective treatment for a specific
ailment.' In this phase the sponsor conducts at least two lengthy and time-
consuming studies within a larger population, in an attempt to discoer negative
side effects within a representative population group. However, Phase III
studies are usually limited to several hundred patients.' If the Phase III
study is for a drug that is used to treat a novel disease, such as AIDS, thousands
of patients who wish to participate will be turned away and forced to wait
287. John P. Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases: Desperate
Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REV. 925, 928 (1991).
288. Other factors are also evaluated, such as rates of metabolism, absorption, and elimination.
Id. at 928-29.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 929.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Scott H. Powers, Note, 7he Right of Privacy in Choosing Medical Treatment: Should
Terminally Ill Persons Have Access to Drugs Not Yet Approved by the Food and Drug
Administration?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 700 (1987).
296. Id.
297. Occasionally the FDA will add a fourth testing phase which resembles post-marketing
surveillance. During this phase, the FDA may re-evaluate approval and demand either a recall or
relabeling. Because the FDA devotes little time to this phase, monitoring, relabeling, re-evaluation,
or recalls are unlikely. John P. Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases:
Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REV. 925, 929 (1991).
298. Id.
299. Id.
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several years for the study to be completed before they may seek to benefit from
this new treatment.' In many cases, especially for patients waiting for life-
saving drugs, this wait will be too long.
The FDA uses advanced animal and human studies to predict the toxicity
and side effects of new drugs even though these tests have been proven to be of
little use for these precise purposes."' Advanced clinical tests (Phase III)
performed on humans add little information on the safety and efficiency of new
drugs' and involve too small a population to adequately determine harmful
side effects in those needing the drug.' Elimination of these unnecessary
tests would cut years off the duration of new drug approval, thereby reducing
costs and time delays, while maintaining strict levels of safety.' Moreover,
the body of knowledge gathered would be significantly increased through
mandatory reporting of the effects of a new drug after marketing the drug.'
Because animal testing and clinical human trials prior to prescription drug
approval, which are now utilized by the FDA, are of limited use 3 W in
projecting the drug's performance once it is marketed in real life situations, the
number, length, and scope of such tests should be reduced, and replaced by
more efficient and effective tests as proposed in the following sections.
B. Limited Initial Release
After a drug has passed the initial FDA standards for safety and efficacy,
it will be made available through hospital pharmacies selected on the basis of
physicians' participation in the mandatory reporting system. Initially releasing
new drugs through pre-selected hospital pharmacies would make new drugs
available to all persons interested in receiving innovative treatments under tight
medical control. The population group undergoing testing, therefore, would
increase substantially from the Phase III tests presently performed, and the
security of such tests would not be compromised.
The drug will reach patients in need of its treatment more quickly, while
not sacrificing the patients' safety. In fact, public safety will be enhanced
because the drug and the patient will be closely monitored by the attending
physician, the hospital, and the pharmacy dispensing the drug. Because new
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 272-291 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 297-298 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
305. See infra notes 307-331 and accompanying text.
306. WILLIAM M. WARDELL & LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 138
(1975).
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drugs will only be dispensed through hospital pharmacies, there is more
assurance that effects, both positive and negative, will be closely monitored.
These effects will append the FDA's general body of knowledge through a
system of mandatory reporting on all patients receiving new drug therapy.
C. Mandatory Reporting
Closely monitored initial 'release of the prescription drug is better suited
than the FDA's current system for discovering adverse side effects of drugs.
Current Phase III clinical studies contain too small a sample to detect many side
effects which occur infrequently. °' Furthermore, current regulatory policies
governing human research excludes pregnant women, particularly in the first
trimester of gestation, as well as other sensitive population groups, from clinical
trials.3' Thus, another "thalidomide" could possibly be developed tomorrow,
tested in animals without adverse reactions, shown to be highly efficacious in
pre-marketing clinical trials,' and extensively marketed before it is known
to harm fetuses.310 Under current FDA policy, the only way to prevent
another thalidomide tragedy is to forbid sensitive groups of the population from
ingesting any new prescription drugs. Obviously this practice is impractical and
unreasonable and must be replaced.3"' Under the proposed solution, even
population groups sensitive to drugs would be tested and closely monitored
thereby making new drugs available to them while closely protecting their safety
and health.
Dr. William Wardell3 12 points out that pre-marketing screening for safety
and effectiveness is inevitably inadequate. 313 As it presently stands, the FDA's
307. Id. at 139.
308. Id.
309. Clinical trials (Phase MI trials) are implemented after successful completion of initial safety
and efficacy standards. This period of clinical trials is intended to assess, a drug's effectiveness and
dosage range in treating a large number of human patients with a specific disease for which the drug
is intended. These trials are the primary source of knowledge about a drug's toxic side effects in
human beings. Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41
Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 458, 464 (1986).
310. Id. at 465.
311. Id.
312. Dr. Wardell of the Center for the Study of Drug Development, Departments of
Pharmacology and Toxicity and of Medicine, University of Rochester Medical Center, is an expert
in the field of drug regulation. He co-authored the book, Regulation and Drug Development with
Dr. Louis Lasagna.
313. Dr. Wardell states:
Toxicity testing in animals can never guarantee a drug's safety in man; neither can
the small numbers of closely monitored patients required for premarketing trials of
efficacy guarantee its safety in the population at large. Given these facts, the actions
of a regulatory agency should hinge to a large degree on the quality of postmarketing
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method of prescription drug approval consists for the most part of only pre-
marketing testing to prove a drug's safety and efficacy.314 The pre-marketing
screening approach has naturally led to the Agency's apprehension about
approving new prescription drugs."'
The FDA's adoption of a unique post-marketing surveillance system that
closely monitors a limited distribution of new prescription drugs through targeted
and approved hospital pharmacies would eliminate the inadequacies of pre-
marketing surveillance that continues to plague the United States drug approval
process. A tightly controlled initial release of a new prescription drug could
better inform doctors, pharmacists, pharmaceutical companies, and the FDA
about the drug being released. The more informed the experts, the better
protected the American public.
Whereas pre-marketing clinical studies investigate drug effectiveness and
possible side effects within a small, non-representative population group, a
system of post-marketing surveillance requires extensive feedback on the drug's
performance among a more representative population. Testing on a more
realistic population provides significantly more diverse as well as more inclusive
data about the drug and its effects on the public.
The Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use found that a post-
marketing surveillance program would provide four major benefits: the
surveillance. If postmarketing surveillance is poor or nonexistent, then the decision to
approve a new drug is a grave and irreversible one; it should be delayed as long as
possible (forever?) in the hope that exhaustive preclinical and clinical testing, together
with the experience of other countries, will reveal all unsuspected toxicity in the drug
before it is approved for marketing. If, on the other hand, postmarketing surveillance
is rigorous enough to detect even rare drug toxicity promptly, then drugs could be
introduced more rapidly, with confidence that . . . no widespread harm to the
community will ensue even if the drug does turn out to induce unsuspected reactions.
William M. Wardell, Therapeutic Implications of the Drug Lag, 15 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 73, 91 (1974).
314. See supra notes 287-297 and accompanying text.
315. As an FDA examiner explains:
Any time you approve a new drug, you're wide open for attack. If it turns out
to be less effective than the original data showed, they can nail you for selling out to a
drug company. If it turns out to be less safe than anybody expected, some congressman
or a newspaper writer will get you. So, there's only one way to play it safe-turn down
the application. Or at least stall for time and demand more research.
Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962, 32 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 335 (1989).
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discovery of adverse effects unknown at the time of marketing,316
quantification of the risks of known adverse effects,3"7 quantification of drug
efficacy,31 and discovery of new indications.319 This means that negative
side effects can be limited while experience with a drug may also reveal a
positive side effect providing a new use for the drug.3" The most important
advantage of a post-marketing monitoring system, however, is that it
substantially increases physicians', pharmacists', manufacturers', researchers',
and the FDA's knowledge base about new prescription drugs, thereby making
drugs safer for their intended uses.32
Mandatory reports on the drug's performance and any side effects (positive
or negative) would be regularly filed with the FDA under the proposed system.
Increased knowledge about rare side effects that occur with a frequency of less
than 1 in 10,000 would now be recorded and applied to all patients ingesting the
new drug. Furthermore, because complete and detailed records will be kept for
each patient receiving a new prescription drug, new developments and data can
be quickly and effectively disseminated to the physicians and the patients who
will directly benefit from such knowledge. This system of greater information
feedback also protects the consumers because if harmful or dangerous effects are
discovered, the FDA has an intact, established, and dependable network through
which the drug can be rapidly and entirely removed from the public's hands.
Through the implementation of a thorough and carefully designed post-
marketing surveillance system, consumers will receive safe and effective drugs
years earlier than they would under the current system. Timely distribution of
life-saving prescription drugs to patients will save American lives and improve
316. This includes the discovery of unknown adverse interactions between different drugs.
Although many patients requiring prescription drugs are placed on more than one medication at a
time, pre-marketing clinical tests specifically exclude this reality and instead investigate only the
single drug's effects. Moving beyond the narrow confines of clinical human testing toward more
comprehensive monitoring gives vitally important information about a drug's potential effect on the
real population who will be using the drug.
317. This includes the evaluation of the moderation of adverse drug effects by various patient
characteristics, concomitant drugs, and other factors. Pre-marketing trials are conducted with very
few subjects, rarely exceeding 2000. Certain effects emerge only when the drug is used by large
numbers of people. Audrey S. Rogers et al., Physician Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior Related
to Adverse Drug Events, 148 ARCHIvES INTERNAL MED. 1596, 1596 (1988).
318. The efficacy information derived in human clinical trials requires supplementation after
marketing with respect to the types of patients, the types of therapeutic practice, longer term
efficacy, and efficacy in reference to new indications. New indications suggest a use for the drug
in treatment of a disease for which it was not originally designed.
319. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF THE COMM. ON LABOR
AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL REP. OF THE JOINT COMM'N ON
PRESCRIPrION DRUG USE, INC. 27-28 (Comm. Print 1980).
320. Id.
321. Id.
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American health. Consumers will also enjoy economic relief from the post-
marketing surveillance system. Because pharmaceutical companies will receive
a financial return on their investment much sooner, prescription drug prices
should decrease, resulting in savings for the American consumer.
The FDA's present method of post-marketing feedback consists of a
voluntary reporting system known as the Spontaneous Reporting System
(SRS).32 The United States suffers from a significantly lower rate of
reporting adverse drug reactions as compared to other developed countries.'
Although a recent study indicated that a high proportion of physicians detect
adverse drug reactions in their patients, only five percent of such events were
reported to the FDA.' 2 In a recent survey of physicians' use of the FDA's
SRS, nearly half of the 1,121 physician respondents were unaware that the FDA
even had a system of adverse drug event reporting.3' Further, only
professional responsibility obligates a physician to report adverse patient
experiences to the FDA.' 2 Poor participation in the SRS could be cured by
changing from a voluntary reporting system to a mandatory reporting system.
Physicians would then be unable to prescribe the new drugs unless they assume
the responsibility of reporting the results.
A commonly cited explanation for the physician's lack of reporting was the
physician's hectic schedule, a factor that is unlikely to change soon.'
Making the reporting of adverse drug events mandatory ensures that physicians
participating in the post-marketing surveillance system allocate the time
necessary to report such vital information to the FDA. Another reason the
physicians gave for not reporting the negative event was that the physicians did
not consider the event "serious." 3' A "serious" event is defined as an event
that leads to or prolongs hospitalization, one which contributes to or causes
death, or which is associated with cancer or a congenital anomaly.' 2
322. The FDA's SRS began in 1960. Stanley A. Edlavitch, Adverse Drug Event Reporting,
148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1499, 1499 (1988).
323. Audrey S. Rogers ¢t al., Physician Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior Related to
Reporting Adverse Drug Events, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1596, 1599 (1988). U.S. rates of
reporting adverse drug reactions are, on the average, approximately twenty-five percent lower than
those in Denmark, sixty percent lower than those in Canada, and fifty percent lower than those in
the United Kingdom. Stanley A. Edlavitch, Adverse Drug Event Reporting, 148 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1499, 1499 (1988).
324. Stanley A. Edlavitch, Adverse Drug Event Reporting, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1499, 1501 (1988).
325. Audrey S. Rogers et al., Physician Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior Relating to
Reporting Adverse Drug Events, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1596, 1599 (1988).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1600.
329. Id.
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Therefore, more subtle indications of an adverse effect are highly unlikely to be
reported to the FDA in the present system.
A mandatory reporting system of drug effects, on the other hand, would
facilitate significantly more information moving through established channels,
including positive drug reactions. Currently, medical practitioners become
aware of an adverse drug reaction only if the patient brings the complication to
the physician's attention.3' And, patients may be reluctant to report these
reactions because they are often afraid to question their physicians.33 The
mandatory reporting system of post-marketing surveillance, however, would
require doctors to inform their patients of the doctor's duty to report all drug
side effects. This assures the patient that the physician will respect and act on
patient reports, thereby increasing the incident of event reporting by patients to
physicians.
D. Legal Authority
Some questions remain about the FDA's source of authority to institute
these proposed measures. One possibility would be to amend the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act,332 which has already been tried once.333 The Senate
passed the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979;' and although the bill
ultimately failed to pass the House, it is nonetheless quite important. This bill
signified a growing concern in Congress for the need to implement strong drug
approval reform, uniting the concerns of legislators with such diverse views as
Senators Kennedy, Javits, and Schweiker, all of whom were sponsors of the
bill. 335
The 1979 bill would have amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) by empowering the FDA to require post-marketing surveillance of a
new drug at the time of the drug's approval,3'3 with the rationale for the
imposition of such to be given. 337 The proposed bill placed broad discretion
in the FDA to require such post-marketing surveillance "at the time an
application is approved ... if [the FDA] determines that such a requirement is
330. Stanley A. Edlavitch, Adverse Drug Event Reporting, 148 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1499, 1501 (1988).
331. Id.
332. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988).
333. S. 1075, 96th Cong., 1st Sesa. (1979).
334. Id.
335. Robert L. Fleshner, Post-Marketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs: Do We Need to
Amend the FDCA?, 18 HARV. J. ON LEots. 327, 339 (1981).
336. Id. at 340.
337. Id.
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necessary or useful in evaluating the continuing safety of the drug." 33 In
addition, the FDA could require post-marketing surveillance, "if the FDA
determines that such a requirement has become necessary and useful in
evaluating the continuing safety of the drug." 3  Although this bill was
unsuccessful, it indicates congressional awareness of the need for and the
benefits of a post-marketing surveillance.
A court has also shown a willingness to accept a post-marketing
surveillance system by the FDA if that system is instituted due to the need for
expert medical judgment in dealing with drug safety and efficacy.' The FDA
tried a limited post-marketing surveillance scheme that was unsuccessful not
inherently, but because of the scheme's subject matter and the FDA's rationale
for instituting it. In American Pharmaceutical Association v. Mathews,3 1 the
FDA tried to institute a post-marketing surveillance system for methadone, a
synthetic heroin.' The FDA attempted to introduce this surveillance not
because of any untested state of the drug, but because of the drug's addictive
nature and the FDA's perceived need to control access to it.
The FDA was prevented from instituting the post-marketing scheme. 
3
The court reasoned that the FDA's restrictions were designed to control drug
misuse by persons who have no intent to try to use the drug for medical
purposes rather than effectuating a system of assurance that the drug would be
used with informed medical judgment about medical safety and
effectiveness.' A post-marketing surveillance system, such as the one
proposed here, instituted by the FDA for reasons of informed medical judgment
about medicinal safety and effectiveness, would not incur the negative judicial
scrutiny arising from the methadone incident.
The FDA may implement comprehensive post-marketing surveillance under
the current statute.' Section 505(j) of the FDCA would provide the
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. American Pharmaceutical As'n v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
341. Id.
342. Methadone, an analgesic and antitussive agent, is a controlled substance and is used in the
detoxification of heroin addicts. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICnONARY 887 (14th ed. 1981).
343. 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
344. Id.
345. Robert L. Fleshner, Poss-Markedng Surveillance of Prescripnon Drugs: Do We Need to
Amend the FDCA?, 18 HARV. J. ON I.EOIS. 327, 336 (1981).
346. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (1970) provides:
In the case of any drg for which an approval of an application filed pursuant to
this section is in effect, the applicant shall establish and maintain such records, and
make such reports to the Secretary, of data relating to clinical experience and other data
or information, received or otherwise obtained by such applicant with respect to such
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statutory basis for post-marketing regulations by the FDA.' 7 Section 505(j)
requires the applicant to maintain and establish records and make reports to the
FDA when it is determined that certain information is necessary to facilitate a
decision regarding whether approval of a new drug application should be
withdrawn or suspended.' The Secretary349  is allowed to withdraw
approval of a New Drug Application if he determines that the drug may be
unsafe.35
Under section 505(e) of the FDCA, the FDA already has the power to call
for added studies in cases where the FDA finds that long-term studies may be
"against the public interest.""' When such a finding is made by the FDA, it
"may approve the New Drug Application on condition that the necessary long-
term studies will be conducted and the results recorded and reported in an
organized fashion."352 This is clearly a mechanism that would allow the FDA
drug, as the Secretary may by general regulation, or by order with respect to such
application, prescribe on the basis of a finding that such records and reports are
necessary in order to enable the Secretary to determine, or facilitate a determination,
whether there is or may be ground for invoking subsection (e) of this section: Provided,
however, That regulations and orders issued under this subsection and under subsection
(i) of this section shall have due regard for the professional ethics of the medical
profession and the interests of patients and shall provide, where the Secretary deems it
to be appropriate, for the examination, upon request, by the persons to whom such
regulations or orders are applicable, of similar information received or otherwise
obtained by the Secretary.
347. 21 U.S.C. § 3556j)(1) (1970).
348. Id.
349. Reference is to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of which
the FDA is a part.
350. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1988) provides:
The Secretary shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant,
withdraw approval of an application with respect to any drug under this section if the
Secretary finds (1) that clinical or other experience, tests, or other scientific data show
that such drug is unsafe for use under the conditions for use upon the basis of which the
application was approved..
351. 21 C.F.R. § 310.303(a) (1992) provides in part:
A new drug may not be approved for marketing unless it has been shown to be
safe and effective for its intended use(s). After approval, the applicant is required to
establish and maintain records and make reports related to clinical experience or other
data or information necessary to make reports to make or facilitate a determination of
whether there are or may be grounds under section 505(e) of the act for suspending or
withdrawing approval of the application. Some drugs, because of the nature of the
condition for which they are intended, must be used for long periods of time-even a
lifetime. To acquire necessary data for determining the safety and effectiveness of long-
term use of such drugs, extensive animal and clinical tests are required as a condition
of approval. Nonetheless, the therapeutic or prophylactic usefulness of such drugs may
make it inadvisable in the public interest to delay the availability of the drugs for
widespread clinical use pending completion of such long-term studies.
352. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [1992], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss1/3
1992] GETTING THERE FIRST WITH THE BEST 137
to institute limited marketing of a new prescription drug pending long-term
studies. This same mechanism, if applied more regularly to new prescription
drugs, could lead to a system of post-marketing surveillance advocated here.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to unnecessary time delays, high costs, and inefficient mechanisms to
determine safety, drug regulation in the United States is in need of reform. The
United States consistently lags behind the rest of the developed world in the
approval of new, innovative, and efficient medications. Other countries have
benefitted from a post-marketing surveillance system of prescription drugs. 3
It is likely that the United States would benefit similarly. Drugs could be made
available to the patients who are literally dying to get them, while reducing the
costs of such drugs. Eliminating excessive animal and clinical human studies,
which now add years to the approval process for new prescription drugs, could
save time and money. The use of a system combining limited marketing release
of a new drug with mandatory reporting of drug effects would guarantee an
increase in the safety and efficacy of new prescription drugs, while shaving off
years and millions of dollars from the process of new drug approval. The
American public would greatly benefit from the adoption of this proposal by
having access to innovative new medications sooner, being protected against a
wide scope of harmful side effects, and being granted a reduction in costs of
prescription drugs.
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